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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. Case No. 20020079-CA 
JOSE ZAVALA-PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of Driving Under the Influence, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (2000), one count of 
Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (2000), and 
one count of Faulty Equipment, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-117 (2000), in the Third District Court, the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: When the defendant fails to maintain contact with his attorney and the 
court, as ordered by the court, is a bench trial in absentia proper? 
Standard of Review. Whether a defendant is properly tried in absentia is a question 
of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1108 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
Preservation of the Issue. This issue is preserved on the record at R. 17-20,24-33, 
and 53 [1]. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: When a defendant fails to maintain contact with his defense attorney for three 
months prior to his trial date, does he waive his right to a jury trial? 
Standard of Review, This Court review a trial court's legal determinations 
nondeferentially for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved on the record at R. 17-20,24-33, and 53 [1]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose interpretation is 
relevant to this appeal are attached at addendum A: 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3 (2002) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24 (2002) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 1,2001, the State charged the defendant by information with one count of 
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44 (1998), one count of Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (1998), and one count of Faulty Equipment, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-117 (1998). R. 2-3. 
On May 24, 2001, defendant appeared at his arraignment at which time the court 
appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. R. 7 A pre-trial conference was 
scheduled for June 18, 2001. R. 7 and Docket Page 21. At the pre-trial conference, with 
the assistance of a Spanish interpreter, a jury trial was scheduled for September 12,2001 
in front of Judge Barrett. R. 11. Defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney or 
the court since his initial pre-trial conference and so a jury was not called. The defendant 
appeared in court on September 12, 2001, but because of the defendant's failure to 
maintain contact, the jury trial was stricken and Judge Barrett scheduled a bench trial for 
October 29, 2001. R. 13 & Docket Page 4. On October 26, 2001, defense counsel 
requested a continuance and the court rescheduled the bench trial for November 29,2001. 
Docket Page 4. Defense counsel filed a Motion to Strike Bench Trial and Demand for 
Trial by Jury, along with memorandum in support of the motion. Docket Page 4. The 
l The docket in this case is contained in the Court of Appeals record, but was not 
numbered as part of the record. The State cites to the docket as part of the record 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 11(a) which specifically states the 
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motion was denied. R. 53[1]. On November 26,2001, the defendant failed to appear for 
his bench trial, and the court tried the defendant in absentia. At the conclusion of the trial, 
Judge Dever found defendant guilty as charged. R. 53 [36]. Judge Dever sentenced the 
defendant to the statutory terms. R. 34. Defendant timely appealed. R. 37. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On February 17th, 2001, about 7:30 a.m., Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Clark 
observed the defendant speeding and drifting out of his lane on California Avenue. R. 
53 [2-3] Trooper Clark stopped the defendant and administered field sobriety tests, which 
the defendant failed. 
A warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued. R.4. On March 6, 2001, the 
defendant was notified by mail of his arraignment date. R. 5-6. On May 24, 2001, 
defendant appeared at his arraignment at which time the Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association was appointed and a pre-trial conference was scheduled for June 18,2001. R. 
7 and Docket Page 2. The court instructed the defendant to immediately contact the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association, and to keep them advised at all times of an address and 
a telephone number where the defendant could be reached. Docket Page 3. On June 18, 
2001, the defendant was present at a pre-trial conference in front of Judge William W. 
docket sheet is part of the record on appeal in all cases. 
Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
[] verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,11 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
4 
Barrett. Docket Page 3. With the assistance of a Spanish interpreter, the defendant 
scheduled a jury trial for September 12, 2001 in front of Judge Barrett. R. 11. 
On September 12, 2001, the defendant appeared in court for his scheduled trial. 
Docket Page 4. However, the court specifically noted that the defendant had not 
maintained contact with his attorney prior to showing up that day. Docket Page 4. In the 
presence of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the jury trial was stricken and a 
bench trial was scheduled for October 29,2001. R. 13 & Docket Page 4. On October 26, 
2001, the defense attorney requested a continuance of the bench trial to file a motion to 
strike the bench trial. A new bench trial was rescheduled for November 26,2001. Docket 
Page 4. On November 20,2001, the defense's motion to strike the scheduled bench trial 
and demand a jury trial, along with memorandum in support of the motion were entered 
with the court. Docket Page 4. The motion was denied. R. 53 [ 1 ]. On November 26,2001, 
the prosecutor, prosecution witnesses, and the defense attorney were present in the 
courtroom. R. 53 [2]. The three prosecution witnesses had traveled from Santaquin, San 
Pete County, and Weber County on three different occasions. R. 53[2]. 
The defendant failed to appear for trial. R. 53[1]. The defense attorney represented 
to the court that he was charged with informing his client of the new date of trial. R. 53[1]. 
Furthermore, the Spanish interpreter at his office had been attempting to contact the 
defendant and had "left numerous messages of the new court date." R. 53[1]. Defense 
counsel stated that up until the Wednesday prior to the Monday trial, the defendant had not 
5 
contacted him. R. 53 [ 1 ]. When defense counsel returned from the Thanksgiving weekend 
on Monday morning, he had some messages from the defendant. R. 53[1]. Defense 
counsel attempted to contact the defendant but was unable to reach him. R. 53[1]. The 
court proceeded with the bench trial and the defendant was tried in absentia in front of 
Judge L.A. Dever. R. 53 [2]. 
The State called Trooper Sterling Clark who testified regarding the stop and field 
sobriety tests he administered to the defendant. R. 53 [2-25]. Trooper Clark testified that 
when he stopped the defendant he took a picture ID from the defendant, and the name on 
the ID was Jose Perez. R. 53 [24]. Defense counsel cross-examined Trooper Clark 
regarding the reliability of field sobriety tests and how he administered the tests to the 
defendant. R. 53[8-24]. Next, the State called Trooper Roy Carlson. R. 53[25]. Trooper 
Carlson testified he administered a breathalyzer test to the defendant, but the test came 
back with an insufficient sample because the defendant did not blow hard enough. R. 
53[25-29]. Defense counsel cross-examined Trooper Carlson. R. 53[28-29]. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Dever found the defendant guilty as 
charged. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly conducted a bench trial in the defendant's absence 
because the defendant was knowingly and voluntarily absent. The defendant in a 
criminal trial has the right to appear and defend in person at all stages of trial under 
6 
article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1999). See 
State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 
678 (Utah 1986)(per curiam). However, that right may be waived "if the defendant 
voluntarily absents himself from trial." State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678; accord State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 989-990. The State has the burden to show the voluntariness of 
the defendant's absence, State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982)(per curiam). 
However, once the State has demonstrated that the defendant had notice, absent a 
showing from the defendant to the contrary, an inference of voluntariness is 
permissible when the defendant fails to show. 
Utah courts have held that "[n]otice served upon a party's attorney of record is 
sufficient to satisfy statutory notice requirements." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 991. 
Courts have found notice to the defendant's attorney sufficient because "[i]t is the 
responsibility of an out-of-custody defendant to remain in contact with his or her 
attorney and with the court." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990 (quoting State v. Love, 
711 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Ariz.App.1985)). The courts have refused to find lack of notice 
where a defendant failed to maintain contact with the court or his attorney. 
From the record, it cannot be determined whether the defendant had actual notice 
of the trial date. He was not present when the bench trial set for October 29, 2001 was 
continued. However, even assuming the defendant did not have actual notice of the 
bench trial date, any claim that he lacked notice is insufficient since his attorney did 
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have notice and he failed to maintain contact with his attorney. The first jury trial was 
stricken specifically because the defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney. 
Docket Page 4. 
The State concedes that the defendant does have a right to a jury trial. Under 
Utah's statutory scheme, the defendant asserted the right to a jury trial, but his failure 
to comply with his known duty to maintain contact with his attorney effectively waived 
that statutory right. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IN ABSENTIA BENCH TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
PROPER BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
Defendant claims his absence from the second scheduled bench trial was neither 
knowing nor voluntary, so that any waiver of his right to be present was ineffective. Br. 
Aplt. at 8. Specifically, defendant argues that he did not receive notice of his bench trial, 
and that the State has failed to show he was voluntarily absent. An accused defendant in a 
criminal trial has the right to appear and defend in person at all stages of trial under article 
I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(a) (1999). See State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987,989 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677,678 (Utah 
1986)(per curiam). However, that right may be waived "if the defendant voluntarily 
absents himself from trial." State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678; accord State v. Wagstaff, 772 
8 
P.2d at 989-990. As acknowledged by defense counsel, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure codifies an accused's right to be present and the requirements 
necessary to waive that constitutional right. Rule 17(a)(2) states that the defendant shall 
be personally present at the trial except that for prosecutions not punishable by death, "the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
17(a)(2)(2002). Therefore, if the defendant receives notice of the trial and is voluntarily 
absent, his right to be present is waived. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah 
1996). 
A. Because defense counsel was given notice and was aware of the bench 
trial for November 26,2001, the defendant had sufficient notice and 
the defendant's objection to notice is without merit because he failed 
to maintain contact with his attorney or the court. 
On November 20, 2001, the defendant filed a Motion to Strike Bench Trial and 
Demand for Trial by Jury. R. 17-20. On November 26, 2001, the trial court denied that 
motion and held a bench trial in absentia. R. 53 [ 1 ]. On December 28,2001, the defendant 
filed a Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Grant a New Trial, which the trial court denied. 
R. 24-33. 
To meet the notice requirement under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah 
courts have held that "[n]otice served upon a party's attorney of record is sufficient to 
satisfy statutory notice requirements." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 991. Courts have 
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found notice to the defendant's attorney sufficient because "[i]t is the responsibility of an 
out-of-custody defendant to remain in contact with his or her attorney and with the court." 
State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990 {quoting State v. Love, 711 P.2d 1240, 1243 
(Ariz. App. 1985)). The courts have refused to find lack of notice where a defendant failed 
to maintain contact with the court or his attorney. In State v. Anderson, the court 
addressed the issue of a defendant who did not have official notice of the date of 
sentencing and 
concluded that the defendant's "failure to know of the continued dates of his trial 
and his date of sentencing is directly attributable to his failure to keep in contact 
with the court and his attorney. A defendant cannot be allowed to keep himself 
deliberately ignorant and then complain about his lack of knowledge." 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110-1111 {quoting Brewer v. Raines, 670 F.2d 117,119 
(9th Cir. 1982); see also State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990 (finding where a defendant fails 
to remain in contact with his attorney and the court, . . . he 'cannot benefit from [his] 
misconduct by manipulating a rule designed for [his] protection.'" {quoting State v. Love, 
711P.2datl243)) 
In this case, defendant had three separate trial dates. The first trial date was set for 
September 12, 2001 and was a jury trial. R. 11. The defendant had actual notice of that 
date since he was present at the arraignment when it was scheduled. Docket Page 3-4. On 
September 12, 2001, the defendant and defense counsel Michael Misner were present 
when the jury trial was stricken and the October bench trial was scheduled. Docket Page 4. 
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On October 26, defense counsel requested a continuance and the bench trial was 
rescheduled for November 26, 2001. Docket Page 4. Although the record is silent as to 
how notice was given to defense counsel of the new trial date, on November 6, 2001, 
defense counsel filed a Motion to Strike in which he asked the "Court for an order striking 
the bench trial currently scheduled for November 26, 2001, and respectfully asks this 
Court to set this matter for a trial by jury." R. 17. Therefore, the record shows that defense 
counsel did have notice of the trial date. 
From the record, it cannot be determined whether the defendant had actual notice of 
the trial date. He was not present when the bench trial set for October 29, 2001 was 
continued. However, even assuming the defendant did not have actual notice of the bench 
trial date, any claim that he lacked notice is insufficient since his attorney did have notice 
and he failed to maintain contact with his attorney. The first jury trial was stricken 
specifically because the defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney. Docket 
Page 4. The record is silent as to any communication between defense counsel and 
defendant regarding the October bench trial. However, the record does indicate that the 
defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney for the November trial. Defense 
counsel told the trial court that the Spanish interpreter at the Legal Defenders office called 
the defendant and "left numerous messages of the new court date." R. 53 [1] As of the 
Wednesday prior to the Monday trial, the defendant had not contacted the defense 
attorney. R. 53[1]. When defense counsel returned to work on Monday after the 
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Thanksgiving weekend, there were messages from the defendant. R. 53[1]. Therefore, any 
attempt by the defendant to contact his attorney was made at most one business day before 
trial. When defense counsel again tried to reach the defendant, he could not reach him. R. 
53 [ 1 ]. Defendant failed in his duty to maintain contact with the court and his attorney. He 
cannot now "benefit from his misconduct" by claiming he did not receive notice. 
Additionally, the defendant argues that neither he, nor defense counsel received 
actual written notice of the trial date as required by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Br. Aplt. at 11. However, Utah courts have rejected this argument when made 
by the attorney or the defendant under similar circumstances to this case. In State v. 
Coles, the defense attorney was notified of the trial date by the defendant, but then argued 
he was entitled to notice under Rule 3. State v. Cole, 688 P.2d 473,474 (Utah 1984)(per 
curiam). The court held "that notice was sufficient under the rules." Id. In State v. 
Wagstaff, the defendant claimed that although his attorney received notice, he was entitled 
to notice under Rule 3. 772 P.2d at 991. The court held that notice to the attorney was 
sufficient to satisfy the rules and "if appellant had performed his duty of maintaining 
contact with his attorney, he would have had actual notice of the time of trial. Therefore, 
appellant's objection is without merit." Id. In this case, the defense attorney was notified 
by the court of the new date, and was aware of that date as early as November 6, 2001. 
Therefore, claims by either the defense attorney or the defendant regarding Rule 3 fail. 
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In sum, defendant's claim that he did not receive notice lacks merit. The record 
indicates that defense counsel was aware of the bench trial date of November 26, 2001. 
Therefore, notice served upon the defense attorney was sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
notice requirements. Furthermore, any lack of notice was due to defendant's failure to 
maintain contact with his attorney, which was an obligation of the defendant since he was 
out of custody. Therefore, the defendant had notice under the codified waiver process in 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
B. Because the defendant had notice of his upcoming trial, and was out-of-
custody, the court properly inferred the defendant was voluntarily 
absent 
The defendant argues that under State v. Wanosik, the state has the "burden to make 
a preliminary showing that the defendant's absence is voluntary." Br. Aplt. at 13. 
Specifically, defendant argues that in this case the trial court did not make any findings 
regarding the defendant's voluntary absence. The Utah Supreme Court held that any 
waiver of the right to be present must be voluntary, but "if defendant's absence is 
deliberate without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence." State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) {quoting State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989)) A defendant is voluntarily absent when he is free to attend his trial but he 
does not. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Utah courts have held that a defendant is 
involuntarily absent when he is incarcerated, State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678, comatose in 
13 
a hospital, State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f^ 19 n. 8, 31 P.3d 615, or acting on the 
advice of counsel, State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1984). 
The State has the burden to show the voluntariness of the defendant's absence, State 
v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982)(per curiam). However, once the State has 
demonstrated that the defendant had notice, absent a showing from the defendant to the 
contrary, an inference of voluntariness is permissible when the defendant fails to show. 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110-1111. Such an inference is reasonable and necessary, 
because, as this court has recognized, "[statistically, the vast majority of court no-shows 
spaced it out, could not muster the courage or effort to be present, or got sidetracked in 
some volitional way. Only a tiny minority find themselves comatose or otherwise 
involuntarily incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
If 20 n. 10. 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court applied this inference to determine whether 
defendants were voluntarily absent from trial and sentencing. In Anderson, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited to Wagstaff, a trial-in-absentia case decided by this court, to 
determine the test for voluntariness. Whether a defendant's absence from trial is voluntary 
"is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances." State v. Wagstaff, 772 
P.2d at 990. The Utah Supreme Court applied this test and found that where Anderson 
knew of the date of his trial, failed to maintain contact with the court or his attorney, and 
did not argue that he was not at liberty to attend his sentencing, that his absence was 
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voluntary and operated as a waiver of his right to be present. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
at 1110-1111. In Wagstaff, this Court applied the totality test and found "that appellant 
failed in his duty to maintain contact with his attorney and the court and, thus, cannot 
benefit by claiming that he was not voluntarily absent from court." Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 
990. 
This Court's particular holding in Wanosik, which presumes a defendant is 
involuntarily absent and requires the State to show voluntariness by establishing that it has 
searched for the defendant at his place of employment, jails, or hospitals, conflicts with 
the established precedent of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 
(Utah 1996), State v. Meyers, 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973), and this Court in State v. Wagstaff, 
772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App.1989). In State v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the defendant's right to be present at sentencing. Anderson was released to 
pretrial services, but disappeared before trial. Anderson still had not appeared at the time 
of his sentencing. Anderson did not argue that he was not at liberty to attend his 
sentencing. The supreme court held that where Anderson offered no argument that he was 
not at liberty to attend, and he could have had notice if he had maintained contact with his 
attorney or the court, that his absence was voluntary. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. 
In State v. Meyers, the defendant was released on bail and disappeared after the first 
day of trial. There was no search for the defendant made by the State. The Utah Supreme 
Court found that a defendant may waive his right to be present, and noted that "[i]n the 
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administration of justice a court cannot be rendered helpless and impotent by the devious 
and cunning ways adopted by the defendant.. . [t]o hold to the contrary would permit a 
mischievously inclined defendant to profit by his own wrongdoing." 508 P.2d at 42-43. 
Finally, in Wagstaff, the defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney, and 
failed to appear for trial. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial with attached 
affidavits which asserted he was absent from trial because he feared for his life. Wagstaff 
argued he was not voluntarily absent because of the threats on his life. This court found 
that Wagstaff knew his trial was coming up, and then he intentionally left the state, and 
failed to maintain contact with his attorney or the court. This court found, "that 
[Wagstaff] failed in his duty to maintain contact with his attorney and the court and, thus, 
cannot benefit by claiming that he was not voluntarily absent from court." 772 P.2d at 990. 
This Court cited State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1935) for the policy behind this 
decision, stating, 
"[i]t is one thing for him to absent himself when he is at liberty and can voluntarily 
do so, and quite another thing for the court to deprive him of any substantial right.. 
.. A defendant is entitled to be safeguarded in every constitutional right, but should 
not be permitted to so juggle with such rights as to embarrass and delay the courts 
or to defeat the ends of justice." 
Wagstaff 772 P.2d at 990. 
This case is similar to Anderson, Meyers, and Wagstaff. The defendant in this case 
knew his trial was coming up, because he was present when the bench trial for October 
was set. Docket Page 4. His attorney knew of the November bench trial date. R. 17. The 
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defendant failed to maintain contact with his attorney. R. 53 [1]. The defendant also failed 
to appear at his scheduled bench trial on November 26, 2001. R. 53[1]. Therefore, 
following established precedent, once the defendant has notice, the permissible inference 
is that he was voluntarily absent, unless there is some showing by the defendant that his 
absence was in fact involuntary. In this case, no affidavits or evidence of any kind were 
offered by the defendant that he was incarcerated, comatose, or otherwise involuntarily 
absent. He now "cannot benefit by claiming that he was not voluntarily absent from 
court." Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990. 
POINT II 
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT PROPERLY ASSERTED HIS 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, HE SUBSEQUENTLY 
WAIVED THIS RIGHT BY FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT 
WITH HIS ATTORNEY 
Defendant claims that under the Utah Constitution he is guaranteed a jury trial for a 
Class B misdemeanor. Br. Aplt. at 17. He also argues under the alternative theory that he 
has a statutory right to a jury trial. Br. Aplt. at 19. In this case, the defendant failed to raise 
the state constitutional issue before the trial court; therefore, any argument under the Utah 
Constitution is waived. Furthermore, although the state acknowledges that the defendant 
asserted his statutory right to a jury trial, the defendant waived that right when he failed to 
contact his attorney for the three months between the setting of the trial date and the actual 
date of trial. 
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A. Because the Defendant Never Raised the State Constitutional Right to a 
Jury Trial in the Trial Court, This Court Should Only Examine the 
Federal Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial for Class B Misdemeanors. 
The defendant concedes that under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution 
there is no right to a jury trial. Br. Aplt. at 16. However, the defendant seeks to argue that 
he has a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Utah Constitution. Br. Aplt. at 17. 
This Court holds that "the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing 
analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, n o t . . . for the first 
time on appeal." State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424,426 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(quoting State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct.App.1990)) Furthermore, this Court has held that 
"[w]hen an appellant does not brief a state constitutional argument below, this court will 
not address it, but rather will analyze the alleged violation under the federal constitution." 
West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 375-376 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) Similar to 
this case, in the McDonald case, the defendant argued that the Utah Constitution provides 
for a jury trial in all proceedings, including an infraction. Id. at 374. This Court 
specifically noted that none of the defendant's motions or arguments before the trial court 
referred to the state constitutional issue, and therefore held under the federal constitution 
that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 375. 
Similarly, the defendant in this case did not raise the state constitutional issue before 
the trial court in either motions or proceedings for which there is a transcript. On 
November 6, 2001, the defendant filed a Motion to Strike Bench Trial and Demand for 
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Trial by Jury. R. 17. The defendant also filed a memorandum accompanying that motion. 
R. 18-20. Within that memorandum the defendant cites Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to assert his statutory right to a jury trial. R. 18. The defendant also 
states that he "has a Constitutional right to a jury trial, as it has been held in Utah that DUI 
is one misdemeanor offense that is not a petty offense, but is considered to be a very 
serious offense." R. 19. The Utah constitution is not referenced, nor cited. Additionally, 
the use of the phrase "petty offense" is the exact language the courts have used to analyze 
the right to a jury trial under the federal constitution. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 
322,324,116 S.Ct. 2163,2166,135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996); Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 
U.S. 538, 541,109 S.Ct. 1289,1292,103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). At the trial on November 
26, 2001, defense counsel did not make any motions or objections on the record, but 
merely stated to the court that he believed there to be case law holding once a jury trial 
was set and asked for there was a right to a jury trial. R. 53 [ 1 ] This language itself has no 
reference to state constitutional arguments. 
The only time the defendant raised the state constitutional issue was in the untimely 
filed Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Grant New Trial. R. 24. Under Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a] motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days 
after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the 
ten-day period." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(c). This Court held that the 
language of this rule "requires that a motion for new trial be filed within ten days after 
19 
imposition of sentence" State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct. App.l998)(per 
curiam). Therefore a motion for a new trial filed after conviction but before sentencing is 
untimely under Rule 24(c). Id. In this case, the defendant filed his Motion to Set aside 
Verdict and Grant New Trial on December 28,2001. R. 24. However, the defendant was 
not sentenced until January 14,2002. Therefore, the motion was untimely, and the record 
reflects the trial court never addressed the motion on the merits. 
Because the defendant failed to properly raise the state constitutional issue at the 
trial level, in either motions or proceedings on the record, this Court should only analyze 
the right to a jury trial under the federal constitution. In this case, the defendant has 
conceded that he does not have a right to a jury trial under the federal constitution, 
therefore, only the defendant's statutory right to a jury trial should be addressed. 
Even if this Court determines the defendant properly raised the state constitutional 
right to a jury trial, the proper analysis to determine the assertion of that right and the 
waiver thereof is found in Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although no 
court has explicitly stated there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases 
under the Utah Constitution, the Utah courts have noted that there is a right under the Utah 
Constitution to be tried by a jury. See State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474,476 (Utah 1990); 
International Harvester Credit Corporation v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 
P.2d 418, 419-20 (Utah 1981); State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976). While 
acknowledging that right, the Utah courts analyze that right using Utah Code § 77-1-6 and 
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Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1986)(per curiam)(where the court was "protecting] a valuable constitutional right" the 
court discussed and followed U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-17(c), (d), as amended (1982 ed.)); 
State v. Stevens, 718 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986)(per curiam)(where defendant claimed he was 
denied a constitutional right to a jury trial, the court quoted U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-17(c), 
(d), as amended (1982 ed.) and discussed the statutory right to a jury trial); compare Salt 
Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, f 13, 44 P.3d 835 (noting that while both parties 
agreed there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for a Class C misdemeanor, the 
legislature is permitted to recognize that right by statute). Therefore, the constitutional 
analysis mirrors the statutory analysis. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
B. The Defendant Properly Asserted His Statutory Right to a Jury 
Trial, But Waived that Right When He Failed to Keep in Contact With 
His Attorney for Three Months Prior to the Set Trial Date. 
Utah Code § 77-l-6(2)(e) states that "[n]o person shall be convicted unless by 
verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court 
when trial by jury has been waived, or in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate." Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e)(1999). Therefore, Utah law provides criminal 
defendants with a statutory right to a jury trial. The legislature has specified how that 
right is to be asserted and the steps necessary to waive that right in Rule 17 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under this statutory scheme, the defendant asserted the 
21 
right to a jury trial, but his failure to comply with his known duty to maintain contact with 
his attorney effectively waived that statutory right. 
1. The Defendant Obtained a Statutory Right to a Jury Trial When the Trial 
Court Set a Date for a Jury Trial. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure details the manner in which the 
jury right is asserted. The legislature treats felonies different than misdemeanors and 
infractions. In all felony cases, the presumption is that the defendant "shall be tried by 
jury." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c). For misdemeanor cases, the 
presumption is against jury trials. Specifically, "[a]ll other cases shall be tried without a 
jury." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(d). For a defendant to assert his right to 
a jury trial he must either make a written demand or the court must order a jury trial. Id. 
For infractions, no jury trial is allowed. Id. 
The State acknowledges that in this case the defendant complied with the 
requirements to assert his right to a jury trial. In this case, both sides agree that no written 
demand for a jury trial was made prior to the September 12,2001 trial date. Br. Aplt. at 20. 
However, a defendant can still obtain a jury trial if "the court orders otherwise." Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(d). In this case, the court setting the matter for a 
jury trial complied with this provision. R. 13. see Salt Lake City v. DeYoung, 2001 UT 
App 310 (memorandum decision)(attached as Addendum B)(noting trial judge's oral order 
setting the matter for jury trial was sufficient to require a jury trial under Rule 17(d)). 
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2. The Defendant Waived That Right When He Failed in his Duty to 
Maintain Contact With His Attorney During the Three Months Prior to 
Trial. 
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the waiver of the right to a jury trial is 
also treated different depending upon whether the charges are felony or misdemeanor 
charges. Under Rule 17(c), in all felony cases, any waiver by the defendant of his right to 
a jury trial must be in open court, must have the approval of the court, and the prosecuting 
attorney must consent to the waiver. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c). For 
misdemeanor cases, the legislature did not specify how a defendant could waive the jury 
trial. This difference suggests that the legislature did not intend as strict a requirement for 
waiver in misdemeanor cases as is found in felony cases. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because 
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would make no useful 
addition to the body of Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Jf\_ August 2002. 
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Salt Lake County District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM A 
Art. I, § 10 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
occasions over an extended period of time and 
while in a position of trust toward the victim. 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988). 
The fact that defendant, who was convicted 
of sodomy on a child, was a victim of sexual 
abuse as a child did not make the imposition of 
a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence cruel 
punishment as applied to him in contrast to 
other offenders. State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902 
(Utah 1988). 
Excessive fines. 
When a nonprofit corporate club violated the 
former Liquor Control Act several times by 
selling intoxicating drinks to a police officer 
and his wife over a three-week period, and the 
club was convicted of three separate violations, 
the imposition of three maximum $2,500 fines 
(making the total fine $7,500) was excessive 
since the officer and his wife were engaged in a 
single mission over the three-week period, and 
the drinks served them during that period con-
stituted a single continuing violation. State v. 
Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
(1965). 
Juvenile proceedings. 
This section has application to criminal 
cases where a presumption of innocence pre-
vails and does not apply to the proceedings in 
juvenile courts where incorrigible or delin-
quent children are being trained and their 
habits corrected since juvenile court proceed-
ings are civil and not criminal. Donald R. v. 
Whitmer ex rel. Salt Lake County, 30 Utah 2d 
206, 515 P.2d 617 (1973). 
Voir dire examination. 
Individual, sequestered death-qualification 
voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital ho-
micide case does not, in and of itself, violate 
the defendant's rights to a fair and impartial 
jury. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Courts, the Con-
stitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 Utah 
L. Rev. 201. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Re-
cognizance § 74. 
C.J.S. — 8 C.J.S. Bail § 69; 22 CJ.S. Crimi-
nal Law § 24 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Automobiles: validity and con-
struction of legislation authorizing revocation 
or suspension of operator's license for "habit-
ual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of 
traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
Key Numbers. — Bail *= 7. 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Civil actions, right to 
jury trial in, U.R.C.P., Rules 38, 39. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abatement of nuisance. 
Capital cases. 
Civil cases. 
—Nature of issue. 
Concurrence of three-fourths of jurors. 
Consolidation of actions. 
Guilty plea. 




Number of jurors. 
Paternity proceedings. 
Request for jury trial. 
Reversal of verdict. 
Unanimous verdict. 
Waiver of jury trial. 
Abatement of nuisance. 
Former section regarding abatement of 
brothel as nuisance, insofar as it provided for 
imprisonment and authorized court in equity 
proceedings to impose jail sentence, held un-
constitutional as violating this section. State 
80 
Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
«=» 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Rule 2 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 396 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v Gardner, 2001 UT 41, 23 
P3d 1043 
Rule 2. Time. 
(a) In computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day 
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall not be 
included in the computation. 
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time m its discretion: 
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request 
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order; or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the 
act to be done if there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to act; but the 
court may not extend the time for taking any action under the rules applying 
to a judgment of acquittal, new trial, arrest of judgment and appeal, unless 
otherwise provided in these rules. 
(c) A writ ten motion other than one that may be heard ex parte and notice 
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of 
the court. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served 
with the motion and opposing affidavits may be served not less than one day 
before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a later time. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment substituted u l l days" for "seven days" in 
the last sentence in Subdivision (a) 
Rule 3. Service and filing of papers. 
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the court 
and served on all other parties. 
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney, unless^ 
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions. 
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution by the court, mail to 
each party a copy thereof and certify to the court such mailing. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
t Service on attorney. record is sufficient. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2a 
Notice served upon a party's attorney of 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indict 
ment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offens* 
has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which tbjj 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense bj 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of thj 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An informatioi 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46^ 
the defendant guilty as charged State v Gen 
try 747 P2d 1032 (Utah 1987) 
Cited in State v Eldredge 773 P2d 29 (Utah 
1989) State v Belgard 830 P2d 264 (Utah 
Am J u r 2d — 2 1 Am J u r 2d Criminal Lav\ 
^ 785 et seq 
C J S — 2 3 A C J S Criminal Law <j 14S3 ct 
seq 
Absence of witness 
Affidavits of jurors 
Bias or prejudice of jurors 
Discretion of court 
Effect on notice of appeal 
Evidence in support of motion 
Misconduct of jury 
Motion to reopen preliminary rehearing 
—Dismissal of charges 
Newly discovered evidence 
Prosecutorial misconduct 
Verdict supported by evidence 
Cited 
Absence of wi tness . 
Where the evidence was discovered before 
trial but the witness was absent, not only must 
diligence have been shown m attempting to 
obtain the testimony of such witness, but an 
application must have been made to obtain a 
postponement of the tr ial so as to give opportu 
nity to obtain such witness or evidence before 
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence State v Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P2d 
167 (1931) 
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to 
produce a witness who was unavailable at trial 
where witness1 absence was not due to any 
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to 
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and 
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a 
continuance to accommodate the witness' cal-
endar State v Gehnng, 694 P2d 699 (Utah 
1984) , T ~ . , , . 
1992) State v Beason 2000 UT App 109 2 P3c 
459 State \ Rudolph 2000 UT App 155 3 P3c 
192 
A L R — Coram nobis on ^round of other * 
confession to crime 46 A L R 4th 468 
Affidavits of jurors 
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which 
recommended leniency was not a chance ver 
diet and could not be impeached by affidavits of 
eight jurors that they would not have voted 
defendant guilty if they thought he would 
thereby receive a jail sentence State v 
Priestley 97 Utah 158 91 P2d 447 (1939) 
Motion for new trial following rape conviction 
on ground of misconduct of jury was properly 
denied notwithstanding affidavits of four ju 
rors filed in support of motion reciting tha t they 
were in favor of acquittal on first ballot but 
that as one of jurors stated that if they found 
defendant guilty with recommendation of le 
niency he would have to serve only a few 
months in jail, they thereupon were persuaded 
to vote for conviction where affidavits showed 
no coercion or tactics which might have 
stripped any juror of his ability to act in accor 
dance with his honest convictions State v 
Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P2d 973 (1947) 
Jurors could not impeach their verdicts ex 
cept in instances expressly made exceptions by 
legislative enactments and, where a defendant 
submitted affidavits of two jurors to the effect 
that , if the record did not support the conclu 
sion of the state's expert witness then these two 
jurors would not have voted for the verdict, 
such affidavits were conditional and would be of 
no avail to the defendant where the verdict was 
justified by the record State v Kivenburgh, 11 
Utah 2d 95, 355 P2d 689 (1960), appeal dis-
missed, 368 U S 144, 82 S. Ct 247, 7 L Ed 2d 
188, cert denied, 368 U S 922, 82 S Ct 246, 7 
L Ed 2d 137 (1961) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial . 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any enoi or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the 1 lghts of a party 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion If additional time is required to pi ocure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix dui ing the ten-day 
period 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge. 
*1 Defendant appeals his conviction for Interfering 
with Officer in Discharge of Duty, in violation of 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.04.030(B), a Class B 
Misdemeanor. While defendant raises three 
arguments on appeal, only one requires discussion. 
[FN1] The trial court committed reversible error by 
denying defendant a jury trial despite previous court 
orders stating a jury trial would be held. 
Accordingly, we reverse. 
FN1. Besides the violation of defendant's 
statutory right to a jury trial, defendant 
also claims that the trial court erred in not 
deciding whether defendant would proceed 
pro se and in allowing Salt Lake City 
Prosecutors to withhold evidence that 
defendant was entitled to receive before 
trial. Because we reverse on defendant's 
statutory right to a jury trial, we do not 
address these issues. 
Pagel 
Because defendant was charged with a Class B 
Misdemeanor, [FN2] he does not have the right to a 
jury under the United States Constitution. See West 
Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (adopting Lewis v. United States, 518 
U.S. 322, 116 S.Ct. 2163 (1996), holding, 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to jury trial 
to defendant charged with petty crime). However, 
under Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor 
can still obtain a jury trial if "the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the 
court orders otherwise." Utah R.Crim. P. 17(d) 
(emphasis added). Defendant concedes he never 
made a written demand for a jury trial, but argues 
he was entitled to jury trial because the court 
"order[ed] otherwise." We agree. 
FN2. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(2) 
(1999) (stating a Class B Misdemeanor 
carries a maximum penalty of six months 
in jail). 
On January 26, 2000, a pretrial conference took 
place before Judge Pat Brian. After counsel entered 
an appearance for the record, Judge Brian asked 
what the parties wanted. Defendant's counsel 
responded, "Your Honor, we would ask for a jury 
trial date." Judge Brian replied, "The matter is set 
for jury trial." A minute entry scheduling a jury trial 
for defendant was signed by Judge Brian. [FN3] In 
addition, Judge Ann Boyden signed an Order to 
Continue Jury Trial, and Salt Lake City filed both a 
"Motion to Continue Jury Trial," and "Plaintiffs 
Proposed Instruction to the Jury." 
FN3. Judge Brian's oral order is sufficient 
to require a jury trial as oral orders are 
enforceable under Utah law. Cf.Envirotech 
Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 498 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) (affirming a contempt 
of court ruling for defendant's violation of 
an oral order of the trial court). 
"When the language of a rule or statute is 
unambiguous, Utah courts have consistently held 
the rule's plain language must be followed." [FN4] 
State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Not Reported in P.2d Page 2 
2001UTApp310 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1243267 (Utah App.)) 
.App.1998). Accordingly, defendant was entitled to 
a jury trial either by submitting a written request or 
when the trial court ordered that a jury trial take 
place. The statutory language "or the court orders 
otherwise" allows a defendant a jury trial even if not 
requested in writing, if the trial court so orders. 
Otherwise, the quoted language would be 
superfluous. See State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, & 
para; 11, 428 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (stating that under 
rules of statutory construction, this court has a 
"fundamental duty to give effect ... to every word in 
a statute[,]" and to avoid interpretations that render 
"parts or words in a statute inoperative or 
superfluous" (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)). 
FN4. Each party concedes that the 
language of Rule 17(d) is clear and 
unambiguous. 
Defendant obtained an order from the trial court 
and therefore had a right to a jury trial. Because the 
trial court refused to grant defendant a jury trial 
pursuant to Rule 17(d), we reverse and remand for a 
new trial consistent with this decision. 
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Associate Presiding J., 
and JAMES Z. DAVIS, J., concur. 
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